Submissive political line of the Party, used the art of revolutionary violence has directed successful uprising Tra Bong and western Quang Ngai 1959, the Dong Khoi people in the Mekong Delta provinces, southeastern 1960. especially as art using our revolutionary violence are properly selected strategic areas and mountainous areas and rural areas V Mekong delta, southeastern a weakness most of the enemy, the far northern hinterland socialist to start, making the enemy completely by surprise, passive. The enemy does not slander the North was instigated to increase military pretext. US - Diem did not understand why we could conduct a massive uprising as such, destroyed large array system each government's rural base them. With the victory of Dong Khoi - 1960, the US-Diem was pushed into the passive coping, moving south to the next network ca1ch advance. Dong Khoi movement, the liberation armed forces was born, grow rapidly with three organizational forms: self-defense teams, guerrilla commune; armed teams provinces and districts; the military units of the district focus, including the regular army was organized popular regimental scale, to the years 1965 - 1966 is the scale divisions.
Since 1961, Kennedy was engaged to fight comb "special war". US strategic measures are used army sweep operation henchmen, gather people to implement "national policy strategic hamlets". US - Wei was completely surprised by the ability to make up the synergy of violent revolutionary approach in the south: "the legs of three shots", combined political struggle with armed struggle, attacking on all three strategic areas, ... that way the southerners were "breaking loose", "break apart", "breaking balls", "broke off the crossbar," Hamlet strategic system of US-puppet. After our victory in Binh Gia, Ba Gia, Dong Xoai, ... From late 1964 to mid-1965, "special war" completely bankrupt, Johnson must switch to "local war strategy". Our Party was expected very soon and accuracy of the development trend of the war (Resolution of the 9th Central Committee, 12-1963), should be prepared to cope, to maintain and advance the strategic practice, the where offensive and offensive right from the first match, defeated in both South and North. Our troops were occupying and building offensive ball near the center of political, military bases, roads strategy to divide and attack the enemy; promptly opened up a new direction to repel the enemy into the passive. In the period 1966 -1967, our troops have taken the initiative to open the offensive in many directions, especially towards the northern mountainous Central Highlands, West Zone V, Route 9, South Delta, zone V, ... A study of MACV (advisory body of US military aid in the south) shows "only 1% of the counterattack" search and destroy "the US military in rural areas met the enemy, and 85% of the explosion the enemy guns had opened fire first. " After the victory of the counter-attack strategy 1966-1967 dry season, the US fell into the "dilemma of strategy".
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