COMPANY CaseTarget: From “Expect Mo

COMPANY Case
Target: From “Expect More”to “Pay Less”
When you hear the term discount retail, two names that usually come to mind: Walmart and Target. The two have been compared so much that the press rarely covers one without at least mention-ing the other. The reasons for the comparison are fairly obvious. These corporations are two of the largest discount retailers in the United States. Category for category, they offer very similar merchandise. They tend to build their stores in close proximity to one another, even facing each other across major boulevards.
But even with such strong similarities, ask consumers if there’s a difference between the two, and they won’t even hesitate. Walmart is all about low prices; Target is about style and fashion. The “cheapchic” label applied by consumers and the media over the years perfectly captures the longstanding company positioning: “Expect More. Pay Less.” With its numerous designer product lines, Target has been so successful with its brand positioning that for a number of years it has slowly chipped away at Walmart’s massive market share. Granted, the difference in the scale for the two companies has always been huge. Walmart’s most recent annual revenues of $408 billion are more than six times those of Target. But for many years, Target’s business grew at a much faster pace than Walmart’s. In fact, as Walmart’s samestore sales began to lag in the mid2000s, the world’s largest retailer unabashedly attempted to become more like Target. It spruced up its store environment, added more fashionable clothing and housewares, and stocked organic and gourmet products in its grocery aisles. Walmart even experimented with luxury brands. After 19 years of promoting the slogan, “Always Low Prices. Always.” Walmart replaced it with the very Targetesque tagline, “Save Money. Live Better.” None of those efforts seemed to speed up Walmart’s revenue growth or slow down Target’s. But oh what a difference a year or two can make. As the global recession began to tighten its grip on the world’s retailers in 2008, the dynamics between the two retail giants reversed almost overnight. As unemployment rose and consumers began pinching their pennies, Walmart’s familiar price “rollbacks” resonated with consumers, while Target’s image of slightly better stuff for slightly higher prices did not. Target’s wellcultivated “upscale discount” image was turning away customers who believed that its fashionable products and trendy advertising meant steeper prices. By mid2008, Target had experienced three straight quarters of flat samestore sales growth and a slight dip in store traffic. At the same time, Walmart was defying the economic slowdown, posting quarterly increases in samestore sales of close to 5 percent along with substantial jumps in profits.
SAME SLOGAN, DIFFERENT EMPHASIS
In fall 2008, Target acknowledged the slide and announced its intentions to do something about it. Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel succinctly summarized the company’s new strategy: “The customer is very cash strapped right now. And in some ways, ourgreatest strength has become somewhat of a challenge. So, we’re still trying to define and find the right balance between ‘Expect More. Pay Less.’ The current environment means that the focus is squarely on the ‘Pay Less’ side of it.”
In outlining Target’s new strategy, company executives made it clear that Walmart was the new focus. Target would make certain that its prices were in line with Walmart’s. Future promotions would communicate the “pay less” message to consumers, while also highlighting the fact that Target is every bit the convenient onestop shopping destination as its larger rival.
The new communications program included massive changes to instore signage. Instead of instore images and messages highlighting trendy fashion, store visitors were greeted with large signs boasting price points and value messages. Similarly, weekly newpaper circulars featured strong value headlines, fewer products, and clearly labeled price points. In fact, Target’s ads began looking very much like those of Walmart or even Kmart. Further recognizing the consumer trend toward thriftiness, Target increased the emphasis on its own store brands of food and home goods.
While making the shift toward “Pay Less,” Target was careful to reassure customers that it would not compromise the “Expect More” part of its brand. Target has always been known for having more designer partnerships than any other retailer. From the Michael Graves line of housewares to Isaac Mizrahi’s clothing line, Target boasts more than a dozen product lines created exclusively for Target by famous designers. Kathryn Tesija, Target’s executive vice president of merchandising, assured customers that not only would Target continue those relationships but also add several new designer partnerships in the apparel and beauty categories.
MOUNTING PRESSURE
Although Steinhafel’s “Pay Less” strategy was aggressive, Target’s financials were slow to respond. In fact, things initially got worse with sales at one point dropping by 10 percent from the previous year. Target’s profits suffered even more. It didn’t help matters that Walmart bucked the recessionary retail trend by posting revenue increases. When confronted with this fact, Steinhafel responded that consumers held perceptions that Target’s value proposition was not as strong as that of its biggest rival. He urged investors to be patient, that its value message would take time to resonate with consumers. Given that Walmart had a decadeslong lead in building its cost structure as a formative competitive advantage, Steinhafel couldn’t stress that point enough.
While Target continued to struggle with this turnaround challenge, it received a new threat in the form of one of its largest investors. Activist shareholder William Ackman, whose company had invested $2 billion in Target only to lose 85 percent of it, was holding the retailer’s feet to the fire. Ackman openly chided Target for failing to deal effectively with the economic downturn. He charged that Target’s board of directors lacked needed experience and sought to take control of five of the board’s seats. “Target is not Gucci,” he said in a letter to investors. “It should be a business that does well, even in tough economic times.”
Making the changes that Ackman and others were calling for was exactly what Steinhafel was trying to do. Steinhafel refused to give up on his strategy. Instead, he intensified Target’s “Pay Less” emphasis. In addition to aggressive newspaper advertising, Target unveiled a new set of television spots. Each ad played to a catchy tune with a reassuring voice singing, “This is a brand new day. And it’s getting better every single day.” Ads showed ordinary people consuming commonly purchased retail products but with a unique twist.
In one ad, a couple was shown drinking coffee in what appeared to be a fancy coffee house with the caption, “The new coffee spot.” But the camera pulled back to reveal that the couple was sitting in their own kitchen, with a coffee pot on the stove. The caption confirmed: “Espresso maker, $24.99.” In another segment of the ad headlined “The new salon trip,” a glamorous woman with flowing red hair appeared to be in an upscale salon. The camera angle then shifted to show her in her own modest bathroom, revealing a small bottle sitting on the sink with the caption, “Hair color, $8.49.” Every ad repeated this same theme multiple times, with takes such as “The new car wash,” “The new movie night,” and “The new gym.”
In addition to the new promotional efforts, Target made two significant operational changes. First, it began converting a corner of its department stores into minigrocery stores carrying a narrow selection of 90 percent of the food categories found in fullsize grocery stores, including fresh produce. One shopper’s reaction was just what Target was hoping for. A Wisconsin housewife and mother of two stopped by her local Target to buy deodorant and laundry detergent before heading to the local grocery store. But as she worked her way through the freshfood aisles, she found everything on her list. “I’m done,” she said, as she grabbed a 99cent green pepper. “I just saved myself a trip.”
While the minigrocery test stores showed promising results, groceries also represented a lowmargin expansion. Walmart was seeing most of its gains in higher margin discretionary goods like bedding, traditionally Target’s stronghold. But in a second operational change, Target surprised many analysts by unveiling a new package for its main store brand . . . one without the familiar Target bullseye! That is, the packages discard the bull’seye, replacing it with big, colorful, upwardpointing arrows on a white back-ground, with the new brand name, “up & up.”
Continuing to address the trend of higher store brand sales, Tesija stated, “We believe that it will stand out on the shelf, and it is so distinctive that we’ll get new guests that will want to try it that maybe didn’t even notice the Target brand before.” Up & up prod-ucts are priced about 30 percent lower than comparable name brand products. Target began promoting the store brand in its circulars and planned to expand the total number of products under the label from 730 to 800. While initial results showed an increase in store brand sales for products with the new design, it is unclear just how many of those sales came at the expense of name brand products.
SIGNS OF LIFE
Target’s journey over the past few years demonstrates that changing the direction of a large corporation is like trying to reverse a moving freight train. Things have to slow down before they can go the other way. But after 18 months of aggressive change, it appears that consumers may have finally gotten the message. During the first half of 2010, sales rose by a

Kết quả (Anh) 1:

COMPANY CaseTarget: From "Expect More" to "Pay Less"When you hear the term discount retail, two names that usually come to mind: Walmart and Target. The two have been compared so much that the press rarely covers one without at least mention-ing the other. The reasons for the comparison are fairly obvious. These corporations are two of the largest discount online retailers in the United States. Category for category, they offer very similar merchandise. They tend to build their stores in close proximity to one another, even facing each other across major boulevards. But even with such strong similarities, ask consumers if there's a difference between the two, and they won't even hesitate. Walmart is all about low prices; Target is about style and fashion. The "cheapchic" label applied by consumers and the media over the years perfectly captures the longstanding company positioning: "Expect More. Pay Less. " With its numerous designer product lines, Target has been so successful with its brand positioning that for a number of years it has slowly chipped away at Walmart's massive market share. Granted, the difference in the scale for the two companies has always been huge. Walmart's most recent annual revenues of $ 408 billion are more than six times those of Target. But for many years, Target's business grew at a much faster pace than Walmart's. In fact, as Walmart's samestore sales began to lag in the mid2000s, the world's largest retailer unabashedly attempted to become more like Target. It spruced up its store environment, added more fashionable clothing and housewares, and stocked with organic and gourmet products in its grocery aisles. Walmart even experimented with luxury brands. After 19 years of promoting the slogan, "Always Low Prices. Always. " Walmart replaced it with the very Targetesque tagline, "Save Money. Live Better. " None of those efforts seemed to speed up Walmart's revenue growth or slow down Target's. But oh what a difference a year or two can make. As the global recession began to tighten its grip on the world's online retailers in 2008, the dynamics between the two retail giants reversed almost overnight. As unemployment rose and consumers began pinching their pennies, Walmart's familiar with price "rollbacks" resonated with consumers, while Target's image of slightly better stuff for slightly higher prices did not. Target's wellcultivated "upscale discount" image was turning away customers who believed that its fashionable products and trendy advertising meant steeper prices. By mid2008, Target had experienced three straight quarters of flat samestore sales growth and a slight dip in store traffic. At the same time, Walmart was defying the economic slowdown, posting quarterly increases in samestore sales of close to 5 percent along with substantial jumps in profits.SAME SLOGAN, DIFFERENT EMPHASISIn fall 2008, Target acknowledged the slide and announced its intentions to do something about it. Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel succinctly summarized the company's new strategy: "The customer is very cash strapped right now. And in some ways, ourgreatest strength has become somewhat of a challenge. So, we're still trying to define and find the right balance between ' Expect More. Pay Less. ' The current environment means that the focus is squarely on the ' Pay Less ' side of it. " In Target's outlining the new strategy, company executives made it clear that Walmart was the new focus. Target would make certain that its prices were in line with WalMart's. Future promotions would communicate the "pay less" message to consumers, while also highlighting the fact that Target is every bit the convenient onestop shopping destination as its larger rival. The new communications program included massive changes to instore signage. Instead of instore images and messages highlighting trendy fashion store, visitors were greeted with large signs boasting price points and value messages. Similarly, in weekly circulars newpaper featured strong value headlines, fewer products, and clearly labeled with price points. In fact, Target's ads began looking very much like those of Walmart or even Kmart. Further recognizing the consumer trend toward thriftiness, Target increased the emphasis on its own store brands of food and home goods. While making the shift toward "Pay Less," Target was careful to reassure customers that it would not compromise the "Expect More" part of its brand. Target has always been known for having more designer partnerships than any other retailer. From the Michael Graves line of housewares to Isaac Mizrahi's clothing line, Target boasts more than a dozen product lines created exclusively for Target by famous designers. Kathryn Tesija, executive vice president of merchandising Target's, assured customers that not only would continue to Target those relationships but also add several new designer partnerships in the apparel and beauty categories.MOUNTING PRESSUREAlthough Steinhafel's "Pay Less" strategy was aggressive, Target's financials were slow to respond. In fact, things initially got worse with sales at one point dropping by 10 percent from the previous year. Target's profits suffered even more. It didn't help matters that Walmart bucked the recessionary retail trend by posting revenue increases. When confronted with this fact, Steinhafel responded that consumers held perceptions that Target's value proposition was not as strong as that of its biggest rival. He urged investors to be patient, that its value message would take time to resonate with consumers. Given that Walmart had a decadeslong lead in building its cost structure as a formative competitive advantage, Steinhafel couldn't stress that point enough.While Target continued to struggle with this turnaround challenge, it received a new threat in the form of one of its largest investors. Activist shareholder William Ackman, whose company had invested $2 billion in Target only to lose 85 percent of it, was holding the retailer’s feet to the fire. Ackman openly chided Target for failing to deal effectively with the economic downturn. He charged that Target’s board of directors lacked needed experience and sought to take control of five of the board’s seats. “Target is not Gucci,” he said in a letter to investors. “It should be a business that does well, even in tough economic times.” Making the changes that Ackman and others were calling for was exactly what Steinhafel was trying to do. Steinhafel refused to give up on his strategy. Instead, he intensified Target’s “Pay Less” emphasis. In addition to aggressive newspaper advertising, Target unveiled a new set of television spots. Each ad played to a catchy tune with a reassuring voice singing, “This is a brand new day. And it’s getting better every single day.” Ads showed ordinary people consuming commonly purchased retail products but with a unique twist. In one ad, a couple was shown drinking coffee in what appeared to be a fancy coffee house with the caption, “The new coffee spot.” But the camera pulled back to reveal that the couple was sitting in their own kitchen, with a coffee pot on the stove. The caption confirmed: “Espresso maker, $24.99.” In another segment of the ad headlined “The new salon trip,” a glamorous woman with flowing red hair appeared to be in an upscale salon. The camera angle then shifted to show her in her own modest bathroom, revealing a small bottle sitting on the sink with the caption, “Hair color, $8.49.” Every ad repeated this same theme multiple times, with takes such as “The new car wash,” “The new movie night,” and “The new gym.” In addition to the new promotional efforts, Target made two significant operational changes. First, it began converting a corner of its department stores into minigrocery stores carrying a narrow selection of 90 percent of the food categories found in fullsize grocery stores, including fresh produce. One shopper’s reaction was just what Target was hoping for. A Wisconsin housewife and mother of two stopped by her local Target to buy deodorant and laundry detergent before heading to the local grocery store. But as she worked her way through the freshfood aisles, she found everything on her list. “I’m done,” she said, as she grabbed a 99cent green pepper. “I just saved myself a trip.” While the minigrocery test stores showed promising results, groceries also represented a lowmargin expansion. Walmart was seeing most of its gains in higher margin discretionary goods like bedding, traditionally Target’s stronghold. But in a second operational change, Target surprised many analysts by unveiling a new package for its main store brand . . . one without the familiar Target bullseye! That is, the packages discard the bull’seye, replacing it with big, colorful, upwardpointing arrows on a white back-ground, with the new brand name, “up & up.” Continuing to address the trend of higher store brand sales, Tesija stated, “We believe that it will stand out on the shelf, and it is so distinctive that we’ll get new guests that will want to try it that maybe didn’t even notice the Target brand before.” Up & up prod-ucts are priced about 30 percent lower than comparable name brand products. Target began promoting the store brand in its circulars and planned to expand the total number of products under the label from 730 to 800. While initial results showed an increase in store brand sales for products with the new design, it is unclear just how many of those sales came at the expense of name brand products.SIGNS OF LIFETarget’s journey over the past few years demonstrates that changing the direction of a large corporation is like trying to reverse a moving freight train. Things have to slow down before they can go the other way. But after 18 months of aggressive change, it appears that consumers may have finally gotten the message. During the first half of 2010, sales rose by a

Kết quả (Anh) 2:

COMPANY Case
Target: From "Expect More" to "Pay Less"
When you hear the term discount retail, two names come to mind mà Thường: Walmart and Target. The two được sánh so much press rarely covers rằng at nhất mention one without the other-ing. The Reasons for the Comparison are fairly Obvious. These are two of the largest corporations discount retailers in the United States. Category for the category, offer very similar chúng merchandise. They Tend to build close proximity có stores to one another print, facing each other across major thậm Boulevards.
But even with such 'strong similarities, ask if there's a difference Consumers Between the two, and chúng will not hesitate even level. Walmart is all about low prices; Target is about style and fashion. The "cheapchic" label by Consumers and the media áp over the years perfectly captures the longstanding company positioning: "Expect More. Pay Less. "With its product lines Numerous designer, Target Đã compared with its successful brand positioning for a number of years mà it has chipped away at Walmart's Slowly massive market share. Granted, the difference in the scale for the two companies has always được huge. Walmart's most recent Annual revenues of $ 408 Billion are six times more coal như Target. But for many years, Target's business at a much Grew Faster pace Walmart's coal. In fact, as Walmart's samestore sales to lag in the mid2000s Began, the world's largest retailer thử unabashedly To become more like Target. It spruced up its store environment, more fashionable clothing and housewares added, organic and gourmet products and stocked grocery aisles its print. Walmart thậm experimented with luxury brands. After 19 years of promoting the the slogan, "Always Low Prices. Always. "Walmart thay it with the very Targetesque tagline," Save Money. Live Better. "None of những efforts into Seemed to speed up or slow Walmart's Revenue Growth Target's down. But oh what a difference a year or two can make. As the global recession Began to tighten its grip on the world's retailers print in 2008, the two retail giants giữa dynamics reversed almost overnight. As unemployment rose and Consumers Began pinching pennies chúng, Walmart's familiars price "rollbacks" resonated with Consumers, while Target's image of slightly better stuff for slightly Higher prices did not. Target's wellcultivated "upscale discount" was turning away customers table image mà who believed its fashionable products and trendy advertising muốn steeper prices. By mid2008, experienced three straight quarters Target hda samestore sales of flat and a slight dip Growth print store traffic. At the same time, Walmart was defying the Economic slowdown, posting quarterly increases print sales of close to 5 samestore percent along with substantial jumps Profits print.
SAME SLOGAN, DIFFERENT Emphasis
In fall 2008, Target announced its Acknowledged the slide and intentions to do something about it. Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel succinctly summarized the company's new strategy: "The customer is very cash strapped right now. And print some Ways, ourgreatest strength has somewhat of a challenge trở. So, we're still define and find thử giữa the right balance 'Expect More. Pay Less. ' The current environment the focus is squarely vì on the "Pay Less" side of it. "
In outlining Target's new strategy, company executives made ​​it clear the new focus was mà Walmart. Target prices would make its mà Certain là line with Walmart's print. Future promotions would communicate the "pay less" message to Consumers, while highlighting the fact mà cũng is every bit the convenient Target OneStop shopping destination as its larger rival.
The new communications program included massive changes to instore signage. Thay instore images and messages highlighting trendy fashion, store visitors greeted with large signs boasting là price points and value messages. Similarly, weekly circulars featured strong value newpaper headlines, Fewer products, and Clearly labeled price points. In fact, Target's ads Began looking very much like Walmart or thậm như Kmart. Recognizing the trend Toward Further consumer thriftiness, Target Increased the emphasis on store brands of food riêng and home Goods.
While making the shift Toward "Pay Less," Target was careful to reassure customers table would not compromise the little truth "Expect More" part of its brand. Target has always known for having more designer được coal any other retailer partnerships. From the Michael Graves line of housewares Isaac Mizrahi's clothing line to Target boasts more than a dozen product lines created by famous designers Exclusively for Target. Kathryn Tesija, Target's executive vice president of merchandising, Assured customers table mà not only would the Target continue những relationships but am also add vài new designer partnerships in the apparel and beauty categories.
MOUNTING PRESSURE
Although Steinhafel's "Pay Less" strategy was aggressive, Target's financials là slow to Respond. In fact, things initially got worse with sales at one point dropping by 10 percent from the previous year. Target's Profits suffered more even level. It did not help matters bucked the recessionary mà Walmart retail trend by posting Revenue increases. When confronted with this fact, Steinhafel đáp mà giữ Consumers Target's value proposition mà perceptions was not as strong as its biggest rival của. He urged Investors to be patient, that its value would take time to resonate message with Consumers. Given Walmart had a decadeslong mà lead in building its competitive cost structure as a formative Advantage, Steinhafel could not stress enough mà point.
While Target turnaround continued to struggle waged with this challenge, it received a new threat in the form of one of its largest Investors. Activist Shareholder William Ackman, có company $ 2 Billion Invested hda print only to lose 85 percent Target of it, was holding the retailer's feet to the fire. Ackman openly chided Target for Failing to deal effectively with the Economic downturn. Target's board Charged He mà of Directors lacked experience and needed to take control of five sought the board's seats of. "Target is not Gucci," he said in a letter to Investors. "It should be a business mà does well, tough print thậm Economic Times."
Making the changes là có Ackman and others calling for was Exactly what was thử due Steinhafel. Steinhafel Refused to give up on his strategy. Instead of, he intensified Target's "Pay Less" emphasis. In addition to aggressive advertising newspaper, Target unveiled a new set of television spots. Each ad is played to a catchy tune with a reassuring voice singing, "This is a brand new day. And it's getting better every single day. "Ads showed Ordinary People Consuming commonly purchased retail products but with a unique twist.
In one ad, a couple was Shown drinking coffee print what appeared, to be a fancy coffee house with the caption, "The new coffee spot. "But the camera pulled back to Reveal rằng couple was sitting trong own kitchen, with a coffee pot on the stove. The caption Confirmed: "Espresso Maker, $ 24.99." In another segment of the ad headlined "The new salon trip," a glamorous woman with flowing red hair appeared, to be in an upscale salon. The camera angle then shifted to show her Artist print the her own modest bathroom, Revealing a small bottle sitting on the sink with the caption, "Hair color, $ 8.49." Every ad repeated this same theme multiple times, with takes như "The new car wash, "" the new movie night, "and" The new gym. "
In addition to the new promotional efforts into, Target made ​​two changes the significant operational. First, it Began converting a corner of its department stores stores minigrocery Into Carrying a narrow selection of 90 percent of the food categories found in grocery stores fullsize, Including Fresh Produce. One shopper's reaction was just what was Hoping for Target. A housewife and mother of two Wisconsin stopped by the her local Target to buy deodorant and laundry detergent is before heading to the local grocery store. But as SHE worked through the freshfood Her Way, aisles, She Found everything on her list. "I'm done," She said, as SHE grabbed a 99cent green pepper. "I just saved myself a trip."
While the test minigrocery Promising results showed stores, groceries am also represented a lowmargin expansion. Most of its Walmart was seeing print GAINS Higher margin discretionary Goods like bedding, traditionally Target's stronghold. But in a second operational change, Target surprised many by unveiling a new package Analysts for its main brand store. . . one without the familiar Target bullseye! That is, the packages discard the bull'seye, replacing it with big, colorful, arrows on a white upwardpointing back-ground, with the new brand name, "up & up."
Continuing to address the trend of Higher store brand sales, Tesija Stated, "We believe it will stand out on mà the shelf, and it is so we'll get new Distinctive mà guests want to try it sẽ maybe did not even level mà notice the Target brand all before." Up & Up prod about 30 percent are -ucts Lower priced name brand products comparable coal. Began promoting the brand Target store print the circulars and planned to expand its total number of products under the label from 730 to 800. the initial results showed an tăng While print sales for store brand products with the new design, it is unclear just how many of Came at the expense những sales of name brand products.
SIGNS OF LIFE
Target's journey over the past FEW years demonstrates mà đổi direction of a large corporation is like thử reverse a moving freight train. Things have to slow down the before chúng can go the other way. But after 18 months of aggressive change, it vẻ có có Consumers finally gotten the message. During the first half of 2010, sales rose by a